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An Ethical Duty to Charge Batterers Appropriately
TOM LININGER*A
Access to a gun increases the likelihood that a batterer will kill his victim. Studies
indicate that the risk of fatality increases five‐fold when a firearm is available during an
incident of domestic abuse. This risk led Congress to pass the Lautenberg Amendment,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm by any person
convicted of domestic violence.
When the Supreme Court recently accepted certiorari in a case involving the
Lautenberg Amendment, many observers feared that a restrictive interpretation would
jeopardize the efficacy of the gun ban for domestic abusers. The Court’s ruling on March
26, 2014, did not seem to weaken the Lautenberg Amendment. The reality, however, is
that the Lautenberg Amendment was egregiously ineffective even before the Court’s
ruling, and the “victory” in the recent case masks an enduring problem in the
enforcement of the gun ban.
Specifically, the charging practices of local prosecutors have minimized the
opportunities to apply the federal firearms disability for convicted abusers. When local
prosecutors undercharge domestic violence – by sidestepping charges that would clearly
signal the defendant’s disability, or by consenting to charges that would likely result in
expunction – they thwart the intent of Congress to disarm convicted batterers. Each year
federal prosecutors only charge approximately fifty among hundreds of thousands of
convicted domestic abusers who possess guns.
This article proposes an ethical rule that would obligate all prosecutors to charge
domestic violence offenses appropriately. In jurisdictions adopting the rule, the federal
gun ban and other ancillary consequences intended by federal and state legislators would
be more likely to attend a conviction for domestic violence. The article concludes by
addressing foreseeable objections to the proposed rule.
INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 2008, Utah prosecutors charged Ronald Lee Haskell with a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.1 Records show that he hit his wife in
the head and dragged her by her hair while their children were watching.2 In
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1. Michael McFall, Ex-Utahn Is Suspect in Fatal Texas Shooting, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 10, 2014,
12:31 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/58170309-78/haskell-county-ronald-cache.html.csp.
2. Michael Graczy, Former Utahn Charged in Texas with Killing Four Kids, Parents, SALT LAKE TRIB.
(July 10, 2014, 2:29 PM), www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/58169710-68/haskell-hickman-county-
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plea negotiations, Haskell’s attorney persuaded the prosecution to reduce the
charge to simple assault.3 The prosecution agreed to recommend that the court
hold Haskell’s plea “in abeyance” so that it would not appear on his record if he
avoided further convictions in the next year.4 This disposition allowed Haskell
to evade the gun ban for convicted domestic abusers under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),
known as the Lautenberg Amendment.5
Haskell’s conviction disappeared, but his violence continued. After his wife
divorced him and fled with their children, he went on a rampage. On July 2,
2014, he tied his mother to a chair and choked her after he learned that she had
spoken with his ex‐wife.6 He then drove to Texas on July 9, 2014, to find his ex‐
wife at her sister’s residence near Houston.7 He disguised himself as a
deliveryman for Federal Express.8 He became outraged when he discovered that
his ex‐wife was not there. He approached the house disguised as a deliveryman
for Federal Express, and asked to see his ex‐wife under the pretense of delivering
a package. When he learned she was not there, he became enraged, brandished a
gun, and ordered the six occupants of the residence—most of them children—to
lie facedown on the floor.9 Then he tied them up and shot each of them in the
head. All but one of the victims, a fifteen‐year‐old girl, died in the shooting.10
Next, he drove to the residence of his ex‐wife’s parents, where the death toll
would likely have increased, had it not been for police intervention after the
fifteen‐year‐old survivor of the shooting called 911.11
The Haskell case demonstrates the urgent need for, and the limited
effectiveness of, the federal gun ban for convicted domestic abusers. Convicted
batterers are much more likely than the general population to commit homicide
when allowed access to firearms.12 Yet the federal government has rarely
enforced the gun ban, prosecuting approximately thirty to seventy each year
among hundreds of thousands of potentially eligible defendants.13 Critics

parents.html.csp.
3. Mark Saal et al., Houston Shooter Had Utah Rap Sheet, OGDEN STANDARD-EXAMINER (July 11,
2014, 5:21 PM), www.standard.net/National/2014/07/10/Gunman-in-delivery-man-garb-kills-4kids-parents.html.
4. Id.
5. For a detailed discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), see infra Part I.C.
6. Tony Perry, Texas Slaying Suspect Had Been Violent with Mom in California, Deputies Say, L.A.
TIMES (July 11, 2014, 7:33 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-texas-killingssuspect-mother-restraining-order-20140711-story.html.
7. St. John Barned-Smith & Cindy Horswell, Prosecutor: Suspect in Spring Family Slaying Shot
Victims ‘Execution-Style’, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 10, 2014), www.chron.com/neighborhood
/spring/news/article/FedEx-disguise-divorce-among-emerging-details-in-5611869.php.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. St. John Barned-Smith, Grieving Spring Community Gathers for Stay Family Funeral, HOUSTON
CHRON. (July 16, 2014), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/spring/news/article/GrievingSpring-community-gathers-for-Stay-family-5624952.php.
11. See id.
12. For evidence demonstrating the heightened risk of homicide when convicted batterers have
access to firearms, see infra Part I.A.
13. See infra note 118 and accompanying text for statistics on annual charging rates under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Lininger_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete)

6/2/2015 10:14 PM

AN ETHICAL DUTY TO CHARGE BATTERERS APPROPRIATELY

175

ranging from the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee14 to columnists for the New
York Times15 and U.S.A. Today16 have bemoaned the ineffectual enforcement of
the federal gun ban.
Why is the federal gun ban utilized so infrequently? Advocates seeking to
enhance its effectiveness have focused on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Lautenberg Amendment, and have claimed that the lack of clarity in the
interpretation of the statute has hindered its application.17 These advocates won
a commendable victory in United States v. Castleman on March 26, 2014, and
improved the uniformity of court decisions interpreting the ban.18 Yet, the last
decade has shown that the most important limitation on the gun ban is not
jurisprudential. It is the reluctance of local prosecutors to charge domestic
violence in a way that would maximize the applicability of the federal gun ban.19
Until local prosecutors charge domestic violence appropriately, the vast majority
of convicted batterers will dodge the gun ban with impunity.
This article proposes an ethical duty for prosecutors to charge batterers to
the full extent of the law. The duty would obligate prosecutors to seek all
possible enhancements based on the relationship of the accused to the victim
and/or any witnesses, and to oppose any proposed dispositions that would lead
to expunction. The new rule would increase the recognition that convicted
abusers are ineligible to possess guns. The appropriate charging of domestic
violence would also have ancillary benefits, allowing employers to recognize
abusers, allowing victims to demonstrate their eligibility for certain government
14. E.g., Hearing on VAWA Next Steps: Protecting Women from Gun Violence, Before the S. Judiciary
Comm. 113th Cong. (2014) (statements of Sen. Pat Leahy, Sheriff Christopher Schmaling, and
Professor Jacqueline Campbell), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/vawa-nextsteps-protecting-women-from-gun-violence (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (noting various problems that
hinder enforcement of federal ban on possession of firearms by convicted domestic abusers); see also
Michele Richinick, Senate Holds First-Ever Hearing on Guns and Domestic Violence, MSNBC (July 30,
2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/senate-holds-first-ever-hearing-guns-and-domesticviolence (noting that Senate Judiciary Committee had never before held a hearing on this subject; the
Lautenberg Amendment passed after a floor debate in 1996, not a hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee).
15. Editorial, Disarmament for Domestic Abusers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/opinion/sunday/disarmament-for-spousalabusers.html?_r=0 (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (arguing that “existing federal laws intended to disarm
spousal abusers have proved largely unenforceable.”) [hereinafter Disarmament].
16. Kimberly Brusk, Gun Laws Still Don’t Protect Women from Abusers, USA TODAY (July 30, 2014),
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/07/30/gun-control-deaths-women-column/13332165/
(“[C]urrent federal law fails spectacularly” at protecting women from gun crimes committed by
convicted domestic abusers).
17. See, e.g., Brief for Children’s Defense Fund and American Academy of Pediatrics as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371); Brief
for Mayors Against Illegal Guns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Castleman,
134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371); Brief for National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371);
Brief for Brady Center for Gun Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, United States
v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (No. 07-608); Brief for United States Senators Frank R. Lautenberg, Diane
Feinstein and Patty Murray as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S.
415 (2009) (No. 07-608).
18. United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014). For a detailed analysis of the Castleman
ruling, see infra Section II.B.
19. See infra Part III.
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benefits, and increasing the odds that batterers will receive necessary
counseling.20
The analysis in this article will proceed in four steps. Part I will examine the
Lautenberg Amendment and the rationale for disarming convicted abusers. Part
II will focus on the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the Lautenberg
Amendment in United States v. Hayes21 and United States v. Castleman,22 and will
challenge the widely held belief that the limited enforcement of the gun ban is
attributable to restrictive judicial interpretations. Part III will explore the reasons
for and harmful effects of local prosecutors undercharging domestic violence.
Part IV will set forth the proposal to establish an ethical duty obligating
prosecutors to charge domestic violence as zealously as possible and consider
objections to that proposal.
I.

THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT AND ITS RATIONALE

When Senator Lautenberg first sought to disarm convicted domestic
violence misdemeanants nearly twenty years ago, his purpose was clear: to
decrease the grave risk that batterers with guns will kill their victims. Research
subsequent to the passage of the Lautenberg Amendment has strengthened the
evidence that perpetrators of fatal shootings are more likely to have a history of
domestic violence
A. Firearms and Domestic Violence
Today, there are a significant number of convicted domestic abusers in the
United States. In fact, offenders convicted of domestic violence account for about
25% of violent offenders in local jails and 7% of violent offenders in state prison.23
Justice Sotomayor noted that more than a million acts of domestic violence occur
in the U.S. every year.24 Given that 40% of U.S. households have guns, it is likely
that hundreds of thousands of convicted domestic violence misdemeanants
possess firearms.25
Domestic violence is much more likely to result in the victim’s death if the
abuser owns a firearm. The risk of violence increases by 500% when batterers
have access to firearms.26 Domestic violence assaults involving a gun are twenty
three times more likely to result in death than those involving other weapons or

20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part IV.
United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).
134 S.Ct. 1405.
RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.,
PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE NO. 45, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 12 (2007), available at http://riczai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p123-pub.pdf.
24. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. at 1408.
25. See United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 294 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing 40% figure and speculating about gun ownership by batterers).
26. Jacquelyn Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a
Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003); see Melissa Jeltsen, Mass Shooting
Analysis Finds Strong Domestic Violence Connection, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/17/domestic-violence-gun_n_5595898.html?utm_hp_
ref=crime&ir=Crime (arguing that the risk increases eight-fold when a firearm is present).
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bodily force.27 In 2011, intimate partners committed nearly two‐thirds of fatal
shootings in which women were the victims.28 Between 1980 and 2008, firearms
were the cause of death for more than two‐thirds of homicide victims who were
spouses or ex‐spouses of the assailants.29
The single most accurate predictor of homicide with a firearm is a
background of domestic violence. Mary Fan at the University of Washington
School of Law analyzed recently released data in the National Violent Death
Reporting System, and sought to identify common denominators among people
who killed others with firearms. She found that one characteristic was more
likely than any other to correspond with fatal shootings: a history of domestic
abuse.30 Domestic violence also correlates with mass shootings, as 57% of
shootings with four or more victims included a family member or current or
former intimate partner of the shooter. 31
The dangers posed by armed domestic abusers extend beyond fatal
shootings. Domestic abusers also use firearms to commit non‐fatal assaults and
to threaten homicides. In 2004, among residents of battered women’s shelters in
California, 37% reported that their abusers had threatened to shoot them or had
otherwise harmed them with firearms.32 In the same study, 65% of respondents
who had lived in households with a firearm reported that their abusers had used
firearms against them, usually threatening to shoot them.33
Conversely, domestic violence fatalities decrease when jurisdictions restrict
batterers’ access to firearms. When police increase enforcement of state statutes
denying firearms to domestic abusers, the rate of homicides committed against
intimate partners goes down significantly.34
B. Passage of Lautenberg Amendment
On March 21, 1996, Senator Frank Lautenberg introduced S. 1632, “a bill to
prohibit persons convicted of a crime involving domestic violence from owning
or possessing firearms.”35 As originally introduced, the bill prohibited the
possession of firearms by any person who had committed a “crime involving
27. Linda Saltzman et al., Weapon Involvement and Injury Outcomes in Family and Intimate Assaults,
267, No. 22 JAMA 3043, 3043-47 (1992).
28. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2011 HOMICIDE DATA
(Sept. 2013), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2013.pdfvisited.
29. ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008 20 (2011), available
at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf.
30. Mary Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence, 90 IND. L.
J. (forthcoming 2015).
31. MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, ANALYSIS OF RECENT MASS SHOOTINGS 4 (2013), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/images/analysis-of-recent-massshootings.pdf.
32. Susan B. Sorenson, et al., Weapons in the Lives of Battered Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1412,
1413 (2004).
33. Id. at 1414.
34. April M. Zeoli & Daniel W. Webster, Effects of Domestic Violence Policies, Alcohol Taxes and
Police Staffing Levels on Intimate Partner Homicide in Large U.S. Cities, 16 INJURY PREVENTION 90, 90
(2010).
35. 142 CONG. REC. S2646 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
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domestic violence,” whether the charged offense was a felony or misdemeanor.36
The bill created a disability not only for defendants who had been convicted of
such an offense, but also for defendants who had been indicted and were
awaiting trial.37 The original version of the bill did not require that the predicate
offenses include specific elements, so long as they involved domestic violence.38
Senator Lautenberg’s intent was evident in a number of his 1996 floor
statements. He explained that, “we proposed that no wife beater, no child
abuser . . . ought to be able to have a gun, because we learned one thing—that the
difference between a murdered wife and a battered wife is often the presence of a
gun.”39 In addition, he noted that approximately two million cases of domestic
abuse are reported each year, and that approximately 150,000 of these cases
involve a firearm.40 He also discussed the fatal consequences of gun possession
by batterers: “[t]here is no question that the presence of a gun dramatically
increases the likelihood that domestic violence will escalate into murder.”41
According to Senator Lautenberg, “for many battered women and abused
children, whether their abuser gets access to a gun will be nothing short of a
matter of life and death.”42 If abusers are permitted to retain their guns, “[t]he
end result, without any question, would be more shootings, more injuries, and
more death.”43
Co‐sponsors echoed these concerns, stressing the urgent need to deny
firearms to batterers. Senator Murray stated:
[W]e know from the research that nearly 65 percent of all murder victims known
to have been killed by intimates were shot to death. We have seen that firearmsassociated family and intimate assaults are 12 times more likely to be fatal than
those not associated with firearms. A California study showed when a domestic
violence incident is fatal, 68% of the time the homicide was done with a
firearm. . . [T]he gun is the key ingredient most likely to turn a domestic violence
incident into a homicide.44

Senator Feinstein stated that, “many perpetrators of severe and recurring
domestic violence are still permitted to possess a gun. Mr. President, these
36. This bill included the following language defining the predicate offense that would result in
a firearm disability under federal law:
The term “crime involving domestic violence” means a felony or misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, regardless of length, term, or manner of punishment, committed by a
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabited
with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or a by a person similarly situated to a
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the
jurisdiction in which such felony or misdemeanor was convicted.
A copy of the bill was printed in the Congressional Record with Senator Lautenberg’s floor statement
on March 21, 1996. See id.
37. Id. at S2647.
38. Id.
39. 142 CONG. REC. S11363 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996).
40. Id.
41. 142 CONG. REC. S11227 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996).
42. 142 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996), S 11878.
43. 142 CONG. REC. S11226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
44. 142 CONG. REC. S10379 (daily ed. Sept 12, 1996).
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people are like ticking time bombs. It is only a matter of time before the violence
gets out of hand, and the gun results in tragedy.”45 Representative Torricelli, the
primary sponsor of the House analog to the Lautenberg Amendment, stated in a
press release on September 19, 1996, that, “[it] is critical to the health and well‐
being of countless American women and children that we move promptly to
disarm wife beaters and child abusers.”46
Senator Lautenberg made a number of concessions to win the support of
Republicans in the Senate.47 They insisted that he drop the language creating a
firearms disability based solely on an indictment for a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence.48 The Republicans also required that no predicate would
qualify under the Lautenberg Amendment unless the defendant had been
represented by counsel in the misdemeanor proceeding or had knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel.49
After these revisions, the Senate approved the Lautenberg Amendment by a
voice vote on July 25, 1996. The Senate approved it again by a resounding 97‐2
vote when Senator Lautenberg added it to a new vehicle, the Treasury, Postal
and General Appropriations Act.50
Senator Lautenberg faced a tougher challenge in overcoming the opposition
of the Republicans in the House of Representatives.51 They sought sweeping
changes to the Lautenberg Amendment as a price for their approval.52 They
proposed, inter alia, limiting the ban to misdemeanants who had been entitled to
a jury trial, were notified of the law at the time of their conviction, and had
abused their intimate partners (as opposed to only their children).53
In order to fend off these major changes, which he felt would “gut” his bill,54
Senator Lautenberg agreed to other changes that he deemed to be less significant.
He reached a compromise with the Republican negotiators in the early morning

45. 142 CONG. REC. S10380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).
46. Source on file with author.
47. Senator Lautenberg complained in a floor statement that the Republicans had threatened to
hold up President Clinton’s judicial appointments if Senator Lautenberg did not relent with his
amendment. 142 CONG. REC. S9458-59 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996).
48. 142 CONG. REC. S8831 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
49. Both these changes appeared in the version of the bill published on July 25, 1996. 142 CONG.
REC. S8922 (daily ed. July 25, 1996).
50. 142 CONG. REC. S10380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).
51. Senator Lautenberg was aware that his greatest challenge lay in persuading the House
conferees, who had thwarted the gun ban for domestic violence misdemeanants that the Senate had
passed back in 1994. “There is no reason why wife beaters and child abusers should have guns, and
only the most progun extremists could possibly disagree with that. Unfortunately, these same
extremists seem to have veto rights in the House of Representatives.” 142 CONG. REC. S 9458 (daily
ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
52. In a floor statement on September 25, 1996, Senator Lautenberg said, “I was told last night
that, behind closed doors, the Republican leadership has decided to entirely gut this legislation and
say that someone who beats his wife and beats his child ought to be able to own a gun.” 142 CONG.
REC. S11226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996). Senator Lautenberg feared a “complete cave-in to the most
radical fringe of the gun lobby,” which was trying to “emasculat[e] this legislation.” Id.
53. These proposals were summarized in a floor statement by Senator Lautenberg on September
30, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996).
54. Id. at S11877.
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hours on September 28, 1996,55 the very day when the House voted on the bill.
Senator Lautenberg accepted eleventh‐hour amendments that, according to
Lautenberg, had been authored by “enemies of the ban—lawmakers who oppose
any curbs on guns.”56
The most significant of the revisions incorporated a new “use‐of‐force”
requirement. As Lautenberg would later recount, “[s]ome argued that the term
‘crime of violence’ [in the original bill] was too broad, and could be interpreted to
include an act such as cutting up a credit card with a pair of scissors. Although
this concern seemed far‐fetched to me, I did agree to a new definition.”57 The
Republican negotiators proposed, and Senator Lautenberg accepted, a version of
the use‐of‐force requirement that was more restrictive than the typical definition
in the federal gun laws.58
One final amendment by Republican Representative Bob Barr added
language that subjected police officers and military personnel to the new gun
ban.59 Senator Lautenberg later indicated that Representative Barr inserted this
amendment after Senator Lautenberg had gone to sleep on September 28, 1996.60
Senator Lautenberg did not object to the revision when he learned of it the next
day, but he had concerns about Representative Barr’s motives; Senator
Lautenberg suspected that the amendment was part of a strategy to make the bill
less attractive to fellow Republicans and decrease the likelihood of its passage.61
Even with Representative Barr’s last‐minute amendment, the House
approved the conference report on September 28, 1996, by a vote of 370‐37.62 The
Senate passed the bill on September 30, 1996, by a vote of 84‐15.63 The President
signed the bill into law on September 30, 1996.64

55. See id. (“The language in the final agreement was worked out early Saturday morning,
September 28, through further negotiations with the Republican leadership”).
56. Guy Gugliotta, Gun Ban Exemption Ricochets in the Struggle, WASH. POST, June 10, 1997, at
A15.
57. 142 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
58. The new “use of force” requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment required that the
predicate offense must involve “the use or attempted use of force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon.” Typically in the U.S. Code, this requirement is defined more broadly to include “the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” Compare 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (narrow
definition in Lautenberg Amendment) with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (broader definition), and 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (broader definition) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (broader definition). Senator Wellstone had used
the broader definition in his original proposal of a gun ban for convicted domestic abusers. See supra
note 45.
59. Naftali Bendavid, A Political Gunfight, 19 LEGAL TIMES 42, March 3, 1997, at 19 (on file with
author). Representative Barr denied that he had authored this change, but most other observers have
attributed it to him. E.g., id.; Guy Gugliotta, Gun Ban Exemption Ricochets in the Struggle, WASH. POST,
June 10, 1997 (on file with author); Press Release, Office of Senator Lautenberg, (Jan. 8, 1997) (on file
with author).
60. Gugliotta, supra note 56, at A15.
61. Bendavid, supra note 59, at 19; see also Press Release, Office of Senator Lautenberg (Jan. 8,
1997) (“Gun ban opponents, at the last minute, insisted into the law a provision that exempts covered
offenders from a provision of the Gun Control Act that generally excludes government entities from
the Act”).
62. 142 CONG. REC. H12110 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
63. 142 CONG. REC. S11922 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996), at S11936.
64. CONG. Q. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1996 (on file with author).
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Two themes emerged in the legislative record that culminated in the
passage of the Lautenberg Amendment. First, Congress expressed its intent that
the new gun ban be applied broadly.65 Second, Congress intended for the new
law to be applied uniformly so that it would reach any conviction for an act
involving domestic violence, notwithstanding the vagaries of state statutory
definitions.66

65. Senator Lautenberg stated that his bill “establishes a policy of zero tolerance when it comes
to guns and domestic violence.” 142 CONG. REC. S8831 (daily ed. July 25, 1996). In a press release on
September 12, 1996, Senator Lautenberg emphasized that “[w]e need to ensure that every innocent
child or terrorized woman enjoys the fullest protection of the law.” Press Release, Office of Senator
Lautenberg, (Sep. 12, 1996).
Senator Lautenberg indicated that any person who has committed an act of domestic
violence, in any form, should forfeit the right to possess a firearm: “In my view, anyone who attempts
or threatens violence against a loved one has demonstrated that he or she poses an unacceptable risk,
and should be prohibited from possessing firearms.” 142 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996),
at S11877. That Senator Lautenberg intended a broad construction of the statute is clear in the
following statement:
We hope that the enforcement of the law will be as rigid as the law very simply
defines it. If you beat your wife, if you beat your child, if you abuse your family and
you are convicted, even of a misdemeanor, you will lose your right to possess a gun.
That is the way it ought to be.
Id. at S11878. Senator Lautenberg believed that broad application of the statute was crucial because
“[t]here is no margin of error when it comes to domestic abuse and guns.” 142 CONG. REC. S10377
(daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). “The lives of thousands of women and
children are at stake.” 142 CONG. REC. S9628 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
Others in Congress stressed that the law should be construed broadly. Senator Kerry stated
that “guns absolutely must be forbidden for those who abuse their spouses.” 142 CONG. REC. 51213601 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996), at S12141. Representative Woolsey made this categorical statement: “It is
simple. Wife-beaters, child abusers, and other domestic violence offenders should not have access to
a gun. Period.” 142 CONG. REC. 118100 (daily ed. July 23, 1996). No less an authority than House
Speaker Newt Gingrich stated that “I’m very much in favor of stopping people who engage in
violence against their spouses from having guns.” Transcript of interview on MEET THE PRESS (Sept.
15, 1996), available at 9/15/96 MTPRESS.
66. Senator Lautenberg made clear that his bill targeted “domestic violence, no matter how it is
labeled. . .” 142 CONG. REC. S10378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). He said that variation among the states’
laws should not hinder the enforcement of the federal firearms ban. For example, Senator Lautenberg
did not want the applicability of the statute to depend on whether the defendant had been convicted
by a jury, because “states vary considerably with respect to the types of crimes for which a jury trial is
required.” 142 CONG. REC. S11226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996). He insisted that variation in states’ plea
bargaining practices should not determine whether an offense involving domestic violence would
qualify under the definition in his statute. See 142 CONG. REC. S10377-78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).
Senator Lautenberg intended for his bill to apply uniformly even though “in many places today,
domestic violence is not taken as seriously as other forms of brutal behavior.” Id. at S10378. Many
sponsors agreed that the application of the new law should not be thwarted by variation among
states’ statutory definitions of domestic violence and assault. As Senator Feinstein stated, “[t]his
amendment looks to the type of crime, rather than the classification of the conviction.” Id. at S10380.
Senator Dodd indicated that the law would “prevent anyone convicted of any kind of domestic
violence from owning a gun.” 142 CONG. REC. S12341 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (emphasis added).
Senator Feinstein, Senator Wellstone, and Representative Schroeder all noted the variation in states’
charging practices, which necessitated a generic federal definition of the predicate offense so that
batterers would uniformly be denied the right to possess firearms. See 142 CONG. REC. H10434 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. S10378–79 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).
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C. Definition of Predicate Offenses
Section 922(g)(9) of Title 18 (“Lautenberg Amendment”) creates a firearms
disability for any person convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence.”67 The Lautenberg Amendment also criminalizes the act of selling or
otherwise disposing of a firearm by giving it to a person who has been convicted
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.68
Only convictions—not
indictments—for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence can result in a
firearms disability under § 922(g)(9).69 Like the rest of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), §
922(g)(9) has a jurisdictional predicate: the government must prove that the
firearm or ammunition in question has traveled in interstate commerce.70 A
violation of the Lautenberg Amendment is punishable by a prison term of up to
ten years71 and a fine of up to $250,000.72
The term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(33)(A):
[M]isdemeanor crime of domestic violence” means an offense that —
(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a
child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the
victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.

In addition to these definitional requirements for the predicate offense, §
921(a)(33)(B)(i) also imposes procedural requirements:
A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for
purposes of this chapter, unless —
(I) the person was represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly and
intelligently waived the right to counsel in the case; and
(II) in the case of a prosecution for an offense described in this paragraph for
which a person was entitled to a jury trial in the jurisdiction in which the case
was tried, either

67. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) provides in pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful for any person.., who
has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.., to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . .”
Of course, there was no need to create such a gun ban for felony crimes of domestic violence, because
all felons are already subject to the long-standing gun ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) (2012).
69. By contrast, in the context of felony offenses, either a conviction or an indictment will result
in a firearms disability. See id. §§ 922(g)(1)-(n).
70. See id. § 922(g)(9) (making it illegal for a convicted domestic violence misdemeanant “to ship
or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.”).
71. Id. § 924(a)(2).
72. Id. § 3571.

Lininger_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete)

6/2/2015 10:14 PM

AN ETHICAL DUTY TO CHARGE BATTERERS APPROPRIATELY

183

(aa) the case was tried by a jury, or
(bb) the person knowingly and intelligently waived the right to have the case
tried by a jury, by guilty plea or otherwise.73

The Lautenberg Amendment includes other language allowing an exception
to the gun ban for defendants whose civil rights were forfeited as a result of the
misdemeanor conviction and then restored at a later time. For purposes of the
Lautenberg Amendment, the forfeiture and restoration of civil rights will be
evaluated under state, not federal, law.74 A defendant seeking to invoke the
exception for restoration of civil rights bears the burden of proof on this issue.75
A defendant who appeals a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence is still subject to the gun ban until the conviction is vacated.76
One unique provision of the Lautenberg Amendment is its coverage of
military and law enforcement personnel, who are exempted from all the other
gun bans under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)–922(g)(8).77 These personnel are subject to
the same criminal penalties that apply to ordinary citizens who possess firearms
after a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
Congress revisited the Lautenberg Amendment in 2006 as part of
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. At that time, Congress
amended the definition of the predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(A) to indicate that a conviction under tribal law would also be subject
to the gun ban.78
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S REVIEW OF THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Lautenberg
Amendment twice. In 2009, the Court considered the statute’s requirement of a
73. . Id. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i).
74. . See id. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (“A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such
an offense for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an
offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored, if the law of the
applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense, unless the pardon,
expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship,
transport, possess, or receive firearms.”); United States v. Wegrzyn, 305 F.3d 593, 595-96 (6th Cir.
2002) (illustrating interplay of Michigan’s restoration statute and 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), which
required vacatur of conviction under Lautenberg Amendment where defendant had successfully
completed probation for misdemeanor crime of domestic violence).
75. . United States v. Bethurum, 213 F.Supp.2d 679, 686 (N.D.Tex. 2002).
76. . United States v. Blosser, No. 02-40074-01-JAR, 2002 WL 31261170, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 4,
2002).
77. . 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) provides that, “The provisions of this chapter, except for sections
922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) and provisions relating to firearms subject to the prohibitions of section 922(g),
shall not apply with respect to the transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or importation of
any firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or issued of the use of, the United States
or any department or agency thereof or any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision
thereof.” The italicized language was added by the Lautenberg Amendment.
78. . Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2005) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i) to cover not only
misdemeanor convictions for crimes of domestic violence under Federal and State law, but also
misdemeanor convictions for crimes of domestic violence under Tribal law).
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current or past intimate relationship between the offender and the victim (the
“relational requirement”).79
In 2014, the Court considered the statute’s
requirement that the predicate offense involve the use of force against the victim
(the “use‐of‐force requirement”).80 The next two Subparts will analyze the 2009
and 2014 decisions, and the third Subpart will challenge the widely held belief
that jurisprudence is a significant limitation on the effectiveness of the
Lautenberg Amendment.
A. Hayes and the Relational Requirement
In 2004, police in West Virginia responded to the home of Randy Edward
Hayes after receiving a 911 call reporting domestic violence. Upon arrival, police
found that Hayes possessed several weapons.81 The federal grand jury returned
an indictment of Hayes for violating the Lautenberg Amendment by possessing
firearms after a 1994 conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.82
Hayes had committed the 1994 assault against his wife, but the local prosecutor
had charged Hayes under a generic battery statute that did not require proof of
any particular relationship between the assailant and the victim.83 Hayes entered
a conditional guilty plea to the federal charges in 2004 so that he could appeal.84
When the case reached the Fourth Circuit, Hayes argued that his previous
misdemeanor conviction did not meet the relational requirement for a predicate
offense under the Lautenberg Amendment.85 He insisted that the definition of
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) requires
that the statute defining the predicate offense include, as a discrete and
indispensable element, the relationship between the assailant and the victim.86
Hayes also argued that the rule of lenity should favor the defendant when a
criminal statute is ambiguous.87 The Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes’ conviction,
agreeing with his narrow interpretation of § 921(a)(33)(A).88
The United States petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted
review. The United States argued that § 921(a)(33)(A) does not require that the
relationship between abuser and victim to be an element of the predicate offense;
rather, the United States contended that the relationship need only have existed
at the time of the offense, whether or not the charging instrument mentioned the
relationship.89 In support of this argument, the United States offered technical
arguments of statutory construction and also relied heavily on the legislative

79. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).
80. United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014). For a detailed analysis of the Castleman
ruling, see infra Section II.B.
81. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 418–19.
82. Id. at 418–19.
83. Id. at 419–420.
84. Id. at 420.
85. Id. at 419.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 429.
88. Id. at 420, 423–25.
89. Brief for Petitioner at 7–8, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (No. 07-608), 2008 WL
4650594.
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history of the Lautenberg Amendment, particularly the comments of sponsors
who sought universal application of the gun ban.90 The United States argued
that the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of § 921(a)(33)(A) would make a
real difference in protecting battered women from homicide.91
Various amici suggested that the Hayes ruling would be vital in determining
the efficacy of the Lautenberg Amendment. Senators Lautenberg, Feinstein, and
Murray – the most ardent supporters of the Lautenberg Amendment in 1996 –
submitted an amicus brief indicating that the Court’s decision in Hayes would
determine whether the Lautenberg Amendment would be a “dead letter.”92
Other amici urged a ruling in favor of the United States in order to ensure
effective enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment and to protect “victims of
thousands of domestic violence abusers.”93
By a 7‐2 vote, the Supreme Court adopted the Government’s position.
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority, opining that the most “sensible”
interpretation of § 921(a)(33)(A) did not require that the statute defining the
underlying offense must include the relationship as an element.94 “Practical
considerations strongly support our reading of § 921(a)(33)(A)’s language,” the
majority opinion observed.95
The Court emphasized the importance of
effectuating, rather than thwarting, congressional intent to disarm convicted
batterers throughout the United States.96
Advocacy groups hailed the Court’s decision as a major victory for battered
women. The National Network to End Domestic Violence issued a press release
commending the Hayes ruling for “keeping guns out of the hands of batterers.” 97
The Brady Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence praised the Court’s decision
to “protect domestic violence victims.”98 It appeared that the Supreme Court
cleared away the hurdles to effective enforcement of the Lautenberg
Amendment.99

90. See id. at 7–11. (analyzing the text of the amendment and countering the respondent’s
attempt at a narrow reading of the statute’s “original purpose” with the statements of Senators
Lautenberg, Feinstein, and Dodd).
91. Id. at 22-27.
92. Brief for United States Senator Frank R. Lautenberg et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, at *23, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (No. 07-608), 2008 WL 2468545.
93. Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 6-7, 27, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).
94. United States v, Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 426–29. (examining the legislative history, as well as the practical considerations,
behind the amendment).
97. Press Release, National Network to End Domestic Violence (Feb. 25, 2014), available at
www.ncdsv.org/images/NNEDVPraisesLandmarkSupremeCTDec_2-25-09.pdf (last visited Aug. 15,
2014).
98. Bill Mears, Court: No Guns for People Guilty of Domestic Violence, CNN INT’L (Feb. 24, 2009),
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/24/suspreme.court.gun.rights/ (quoting Paul Helmke,
president of Brady Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence).
99. See Tanjima Islam, The Fourth Circuit’s Rejection of Legislative History: Placing Guns in the
Hands of Domestic Abuse Perpetrators, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 341, 365 (2010) (“The
Supreme Court’s holding in Hayes ensures that courts will apply the Lautenberg Amendment
appropriately to properly punish domestic violence offenders”).
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B. Castleman and the Use-of-Force Requirement
Five years later, in 2014, the United States and a long list of amici were once
again asking the Supreme Court to breathe life into the Lautenberg Amendment.
The 2014 case involved a defendant in Tennessee, James Alvin Castleman, who
had possessed firearms in 2008 after a 2001 conviction for “intentionally or
knowingly causing bodily injury to” the mother of his child.100 Charged in
federal court with violating the Lautenberg Amendment, he moved to dismiss
the indictment on the ground that the predicate offense did not meet the use‐of‐
force requirement in § 921(a)(33)(A).101 He claimed that the act at issue in his
2001 conviction was simply an offensive touching, not an act of violence within
the meaning of the use‐of‐force requirement in § 921(a)(33)(A). The Sixth Circuit
agreed with Castleman and reversed his conviction.102
The United States petitioned for certiorari to make the argument that an
offensive touching involves a sufficient use of force to qualify as a predicate
under the Lautenberg Amendment.103 According to the United States, the phrase
“domestic violence” is a term of art that means something broader than mere
“violence,” and spans a range of harmful conduct that does not necessarily
involve a forceful blow.104 As in Hayes, the United States highlighted comments
in the legislative history of the Lautenberg Amendment to support their position
that the sponsors’ intent that the gun ban apply broadly irrespective of variations
in states’ definitions of domestic violence. 105
The government’s position attracted support from several amici. For
example, Mayors Against Gun Violence filed a brief asserting that a ruling for
the United States in Castleman would “keep guns out of the hands of convicted
abusers.”106 The National Network to End Domestic Violence beseeched the Court
to support the United States’ position and “allow Section 922(g)(9) to do the
important work that Congress enacted it to do.”107 The Brady Center to Prevent
Gun Violence filed a brief contending that the proper interpretation of the
Lautenberg Amendment would make “[gun‐related] violence less likely by
punishing – and thus deterring – such conduct.”108
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government. The Court explained
that while minor uses of force may not amount to “violence” in the generic sense,
they do suffice for the use‐of‐force requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment.109
Within the unique context of domestic violence, offensive touching can be very

100.
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014).
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 1409–10.
103. Brief for Petitioner at 13–19, United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371).
104. Id. at 19.
105. Id. at 35-47.
106.
See Brief for Mayors Against Illegal Guns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,
United States v. Castleman, 135 S. Ct. 1504 (2014) (No. 12-1371).
107. Brief for National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 33, United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371), 2013 WL 6228470.
108. Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 11, United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371) 2013 WL 6213274.
109. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411 (2014).
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harmful, especially when continued over a prolonged period.110 The Court was
mindful that a broad reading of the use‐of‐force requirement could facilitate the
more effective implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment because many
local prosecutors charge domestic violence under statutes that do not require use
of force in the strictest sense. 111
Advocates for the government’s position celebrated the Castleman ruling as
a huge step forward for battered women. Jonathan Lowy, a lawyer for the Brady
Center to Prevent Gun Violence, described it as “an important victory for
women, children and families across the nation who will continue to be
protected by strong, sensible federal laws that keep domestic‐violence abusers
from obtaining guns.”112 The White House issued a press release expressing
confidence in the efficacy of the Castleman ruling: “[t]his week the Supreme
Court decided a case that will save women’s lives.”113
C. The Fallacy That Judicial Interpretations Constrain Lautenberg
There is a widespread belief that judicial interpretation of the Lautenberg
Amendment played a significant role in determining the effectiveness of the gun
ban for convicted domestic abusers.114 For example, one commentator predicted
that the Supreme Court’s holding in Hayes would “effectuate the purpose” of the
Lautenberg Amendment and deny firearms to batterers.115
Another
commentator wrote that a broad judicial interpretation of Lautenberg would
“give full effect to Congress’s intent,”116 but that “the wrong decision by the
Court could leave abused women and children vulnerable to gun violence.”117 A
press release from Mayors Against Illegal Guns in 2014 summed up the
prevailing belief about the importance of the judiciary in implementing the gun
ban for convicted abusers: “[w]e’re counting on the Supreme Court to keep
Americans safe.”118
110.
Id. at 1412.
111.
Id. at 1413.
112. David G. Savage, High Court Adds Muscle to Limits on Gun Ownership, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar.
27, 2014, at A2 (on file with author).
113.
Press Release, The White House, Lynn Rosenthal (Mar. 28, 2014) (on file with author).
114. E.g., Abigail Browning, Domestic Violence and Gun Control: Determining the Proper
Interpretation of ‘Physical Force” in the Implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment, 33 WASH. U. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 273, 293 (2010) (discussing the “vital role” played by the courts).
115. See Tanjima Islam, The Fourth Circuit’s Rejection of Legislative History: Placing Guns in the
Hands of Domestic Abuse Perpetrators, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 341, 365 (2010) (“The
Supreme Court’s holding in Hayes ensures that courts will apply the Lautenberg Amendment
appropriately to properly punish domestic violence offenders”).
116. Babk Lalezari, Domestic Violence: Enough is Enough, Any Force Is Enough, 1 PHOENIX L. REV.
295, 319 (2008) (suggesting that a pro-government ruling in Hayes would “effectuate Congress’s
efforts to curb the violent outcomes of a pervasive social problem.”).
117. This quote is from an opinion piece about Castleman by a leader of Moms Demand Action for
Gun Sense in America. Linda McFadyen-Ketchum, Supreme Court Must Protect Victims of Domestic
Violence, HUFF. POST, Jan. 15, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 1225727.
118. Press Release, Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Case Will Determine Whether Domestic
Violence Offenders Can Possess Guns (Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/statement-from-mayors-against-illegal-guns-on-united-states-v-castleman240313601.html).
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This faith is misplaced. The Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Lautenberg Amendment matter very little if federal prosecutors rarely utilize the
statute. Favorable interpretations of the relational requirement or the use‐of‐
force requirement do not put gun‐toting batterers in prison. The Court’s
willingness to construe 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) in accordance with
congressional intent is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successful
prosecution of gun possession by convicted domestic violence misdemeanants.
The most important variable for effective enforcement is the number of charges
filed by federal prosecutors under the Lautenberg Amendment.
Charging rates remained low after the Hayes ruling in 2009. The year before
it was decided, federal prosecutors charged 67 defendants under the Lautenberg
Amendment.119 The Supreme Court decided Hayes in February 2009, and one
might have expected an increase in the number of charges filed thereafter. But
the number of defendants charged under the Lautenberg Amendment in 2009
actually dropped to 49. The number rose to 56 in 2010, dropped to 40 in 2011, and
dropped further to 32 in 2012.120 In none of the four years following the Hayes
ruling did the number of defendants charged under the Lautenberg Amendment
exceed the number charged in the year immediately prior to the Hayes ruling.121
These data cast doubt on the assumption that the Hayes ruling fixed a
jurisprudential problem that had constrained the enforcement of the gun ban for
domestic abusers. The commentators who predicted that the Hayes ruling would
increase prosecutors’ use of the Lautenberg amendment were mistaken.
There is no cause for optimism that Castleman will make more of a
difference. Indeed, very few jurisdictions had interpreted the use‐of‐force
requirement restrictively before the Court overruled this interpretation in
Castleman,122 so there is little reason to expect that it will bring increased
prosecutions under the Lautenberg Amendment.
Some advocates who defend the efficacy of the gun ban for convicted
abusers point to the total number of background checks that led to denials due to
a prior conviction for domestic violence. For example, Senator Lautenberg
himself referred to thousands of purchases prevented by his amendment.123
Background checks do not deny guns to all convicted batterers, however. One

119. This figure indicates the number of cases in which a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) was
the “lead charge,” which is generally true when an indictment includes § 922(g)(9), because U.S.
Attorneys like to draw attention to their use of this statute. See TRANSACTION RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE, SYRACUSE UNIV., FEDERAL WEAPONS ENFORCEMENT: A MOVING TARGET, (2013),
available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/307/.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1410 (2014); see also Adam Kersey, Misdemeanants,
Firearms, and Discretion: The Practical Impact of the Debate Over “Physical Force” and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),
49 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV., 1904–16 (2008) (noting that even by 2008, most federal circuit courts
reaching the question had taken the position that the United States would later advocate in
Castleman).
123. In 2008, Senator Lautenberg claimed on his campaign website that the Lautenberg
Amendment had stopped thousands of attempted gun purchases by convicted domestic violence
misdemeanants. See On The Issues, ON THE ISSUES http://www.ontheissues.org/Domestic
/Frank_Lautenberg_Gun_Control.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (citing to Senator Lautenberg’s
original statement on www.lautenbergfornj.com, Aug, 12, 2008).
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problem is that the background checks rely on an incomplete database of
convictions that undercounts misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.124 Even
when a background check thwarts an attempted purchase by a convicted
domestic violence misdemeanant, the hindrance is usually only momentary.
Purchasers disqualified in background checks easily buy guns from sellers who
are not federally licensed, and who do not need to run background checks on
purchasers.125 For example, neighbors and vendors at gun shows are exempt
from running background checks.126 Further, the black market provides many
options to a determined purchaser. Enforcement that consists primarily of
background checks by licensed dealers, as opposed to prosecution for unlawful
possession, provides scant protection for victims of domestic violence.
In sum, the sanguine commentary on Hayes and Castleman masks a more
basic problem that limits the effectiveness of the Lautenberg Amendment.
Federal prosecutors simply do not utilize the Lautenberg Amendment very
much, and their willingness to use the statute does not seem sensitive to the
Supreme Court’s construction of the language in § 921(a)(33)(A). The reasons for
underutilization of the Lautenberg Amendment by federal prosecutors are the
focus of the Part III.
III. THE REAL CULPRIT: UNDERCHARGING BY LOCAL PROSECUTORS
Why do federal prosecutors file so few charges under the Lautenberg
Amendment? These charges are fairly easy to prove127—the evidence need only
show the fact of possession and the fact of the prior qualifying conviction (a task
124. Senator Chuck Grassley testified on July 30, 2014, that states’ submissions to the federal NCIS
database are woefully insufficient to ensure that background checks will detect all gun purchasers
with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. According to Senator Grassley’s
testimony, only 36 states have submitted any domestic violence misdemeanor convictions to the
NCIS index, and of these, 21 states have submitted 20 or fewer records. Taking Effective Action Against
Perpetrators of Domestic Violence: Hearing on VAWA Next Steps: Protecting Women from Gun Violence,
(July 30, 2014), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/taking-effectiveaction-against-perpetrators-domestic-violence.
125. The National Network to End Domestic Violence noted that gun shows allow convicted
domestic violence misdemeanants to obtain firearms despite the Lautenberg Amendment, because
dealers at gun shows do not need to run background checks: “In more than 40 states, criminal
convicted of domestic violence offenses (and other prohibited purchasers) can avoid background
checks by buying guns – often at gun shows or though anonymous online transactions – from
unlicensed private sellers who are not required by current federal law to conduct background
checks.” Too Many Domestic Homicide Victims, NATIONAL NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(Feb. 24, 2014), http://nnedv.org/news/4218-too-many-domestic-violence-homicide-victims.html
(last visited Aug. 19, 2014); see also Interview by Bob Schieffer with Michael Bloomberg, Mayor of
New York (July 22, 2012), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcriptsjuly-22-2012-aurora-mayor-and-police-chief-mayor-bloomberg-pm-netanyahu/ (last visited Aug. 19,
2014) (asserting that there are no background checks in approximately 40% of all gun transactions).
126. Bloomberg, supra note 125; NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 125.
127. Proof of possession is usually fairly straightforward. In a large percentage of prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the prosecutor just calls the police officer who found the weapon,
typically in a vehicle stop or during execution of a search warrant. Unlike other prosecutions of
batterers, a prosecution for firearm possession by a convicted batterer rarely necessitates that the
government call a battered woman to the stand. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 817-18 (2005) (noting that charge of gun possession by convicted
domestic violence misdemeanant is easier to prove that charge of domestic assault).
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made easier by the Supreme Court’s favorable jurisprudence).128 The low
number of federal prosecutions filed under the Lautenberg Amendment is not
due to the difficulty of proving such cases, but rather to the lack of opportunity
to charge them. In other words, federal law enforcement agents are not referring
many cases that meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).129
Why do federal law enforcement officers refer so few prosecutable cases
under the Lautenberg Amendment? The explanation lies in the difficulty of
finding such convictions in federal databases such as the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS).130 Underreporting of qualifying
convictions to NICS remained a significant problem even in 2014.131 Even when
local jurisdictions enter qualifying convictions into NICS, they are not
conspicuous as predicates for 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), because most are under
generic assault statutes that do not require proof of domestic abuse.132 As
Senator Lautenberg himself cautioned when advocating for passage of his
amendment in 1996:
128. See infra subsections II.A-B.
129. During the period from 2000 to 2002, referrals for prosecutions under both § 922(g)(8) (the
gun ban for batterers subject to restraining orders) and § 922(g)(9) (the gun ban for convicted
domestic violence misdemeanants) made up just 3% of all referrals to federal prosecutors under the
broad heading of family violence. MATTHEW R. DUROSE et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY
VIOLENCE STATISTICS: INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 51 (2005) (referring
to 2000-02), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
The 3% figure includes referrals of both felony predicates and misdemeanor predicates involving
domestic violence, so the number of referrals that uniquely matched the requirements of the gun ban
for convicted domestic violence misdemeanants (as opposed to the general gun ban for felons) was
even smaller. Kersey, supra note 122, at 1920.
130. Bernard H. Teodorski, the National Vice President of the Fraternal Order of Police, testified
before Congress when the Lautenberg Amendment was under consideration. He expressed his fear
that convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence would be difficult to detect. “The
statute has created a large new category of prohibited persons lacking adequate definition –
enforcement turns on the highly fact-specific findings in each individual case. From any standpoint,
the statute is an enforcement nightmare.” Amend Section 658 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Omnibus
Appropriations Act: Gun Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Bernard H.
Teodorski, National Vice President of the Fraternal Order of Police) (source on file with author).
131. Senator Chuck Grassley testified on July 30, 2014, that states’ submissions to the federal NCIS
database are woefully insufficient to ensure that background checks will detect all gun purchasers
with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. According to Senator Grassley’s
testimony, only 36 states have submitted any domestic violence misdemeanor convictions to the
NCIS index, and of these, 21 states have submitted 20 or fewer records. Testimony of Senator Chuck
Grassley, Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearing on VAWA Next Steps: Protecting Women from Gun
Violence, July 30, 2014, prepared statement available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/newsreleases/taking-effective-action-against-perpetrators-domestic-violence (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).
132. Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Disarming Batterers: the Impact of Domestic
Violence Firearm Laws, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 186–77 (Jens
Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (discussing challenge that misdemeanor crimes of domestic
violence are not properly memorialized in federal databases of convictions; this problem significantly
limits the effectiveness of the gun ban for convicted domestic violence misdemeanants); cf. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-720, GUN CONTROL: OPPORTUNITIES TO CLOSE LOOPHOLES IN THE
NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM 17–23 (2003) (noting that NICS process for
recording convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence is insufficient swift and through,
and as a result, an alarming number of convicted domestic violence misdemeanants are able to buy
firearms despite undergoing background checks).
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Convictions for domestic violence-related crimes often are for crimes, such as
assault, that are not explicitly identified as related to domestic violence.
Therefore it will not always be possible for law enforcement authorities to
determine from the face of someone’s criminal record whether a particular
misdemeanor conviction involves domestic violence, as defined in the new
law.133

The challenge of discerning domestic violence is particularly difficult when the
defendant enters a guilty plea – the most common type of conviction under
simple assault statutes.134 There may be an abundance of misdemeanor
convictions that could qualify under the Lautenberg Amendment, but these
convictions are difficult to recognize in federal databases.
The lack of clarity is due in large part to local prosecutors’ practice of
undercharging domestic violence in the first place. Local prosecutors rarely
charge defendants under the specialized statutes that clearly indicate the
commission of domestic violence,135 even though these statutes now exist in half
the states.136 Prosecutors are presently under no obligation to invoke the
specialized statutes, and they prefer to file more general assault charges or
reduced charges.137 The following subsections consider the reasons why
prosecutors undercharge domestic violence, the harmful effects of such
undercharging, and the inadequacy of current safeguards designed to ensure
appropriate charging.
A. Reasons for Undercharging
Undercharging of domestic violence can take several forms. Sometimes,
local prosecutors select a lenient charge, or a charge without an enhancement
133. 142 CONG. REC. 26675 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
134. E.g., United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 140-41, 145 (2d Cir. 2002) (attempting to
discern whether requisite relationship existed by examining documents from state proceeding,
including statement of conviction and transcript from plea hearing, and ultimately remanding
question because there was “no information in the indictment, the plea hearing transcript, or the
statement of conviction describing the nature of the relationship between the Defendant and his
victim”).
135. Local prosecutors generally charge domestic violence under generic assault statutes, even
when more specialized statutes are available. As the Supreme Court observed in 2014, “even
perpetrators of severe domestic violence are often convicted under generally applicable assault and
battery laws”. U.S. v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1415 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also U.S. v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (“[Even in states] with criminal statutes that specifically
proscribed domestic violence . . . domestic abusers were (and are) routinely prosecuted under
generally applicable assault or battery laws”).
136. Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 6, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009); see also BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, NAT’L
CTR. ON FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, STATE STATUTES: MISDEMEANOR CRIMES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/State-MCDV-Matrix.pdf (setting forth a
matrix of state statutes defining misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence).
137. JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 3.09 (3d. 2003) (noting that charging
decision is made “virtually free from judicial control”); Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009),
supra note 136 (“Even in states that have laws that include such a relationship as an element,
prosecutors have been free to bring charges or accept pleas that do not include the relationship as an
element of the crime . . .”).
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based on the relationship between the offender and the victim. Other times,
prosecutors dismiss the case altogether. Even when they file strict charges at the
outset, they might later engage in “charge bargaining” as part of plea
negotiations. Prosecutors might agree to dispose of charges by means of pretrial
diversion, such that the defendant would avoid punishment if he keeps a clean
record. Sometimes the prosecution might agree to expunction or restoration of
gun rights after conviction and service of the sentence. This subsection will refer
to all of the foregoing strategies by the shorthand “undercharging.”
The reasons for undercharging are manifold. Some prosecutors simply do
not take domestic violence seriously.138 One author discussed an old‐fashioned
view that is “disdainful of prosecuting domestic violence cases” because of the
perception that such cases are “trivial.”139 A prosecutor with such a view might
sympathize with defendants and not want to take away their rights to possess
firearms, especially if the defendants are law enforcement officers or military
personnel whose loss of gun rights might cause them to lose their jobs.140
Alternatively, some local prosecutors might choose to “deal down” cases for
the sake of expediency.141 These prosecutors may believe that they will
accomplish more good by charging a large volume of domestic violence cases
and disposing of them quickly through plea agreements. The prosecutors might
also choose to accept guilty pleas because judges want to clear their dockets.142
Defendants are eager to plead when presented with the alternative of a reduced
charge less likely to result in a firearms disability.
Some prosecutors undercharge domestic violence because they believe it is
difficult to take such cases to trial. Complainants in domestic violence cases
often recant or refuse to testify.143 Their reluctance can create major problems for
the prosecution, especially after the Supreme Court’s rulings under the

138. Senator Frank Lautenberg discussed this problem in a floor statement. “Under current
Federal law, it is illegal for persons convicted of felonies to possess firearms. Yet, many people who
engage in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or convicted of felonies. At
the end of the day, due to outdated laws or thinking, they are, at most, convicted of a misdemeanor.
In fact, most of hose who commit family violence are never even prosecuted. But when they are, onethird of the cases that would be considered felonies, if committed by strangers, are instead filed as
misdemeanors. The fact is that in many places domestic violence is not taken as seriously as other
forms of brutal behavior. Often acts of serious spousal abuse are not even considered felonies.” 142
CONG. REC. S10377-78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).
139. Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey of Large
Jurisdictions, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 176, 176-77 (1996).
140. Kersey, supra note 122, at 1924 (“The decision to prosecute may hinge on the decision to take
away the ability to possess a firearm. The decision to remove firearms may be especially difficult in
law enforcement or military contexts.”).
141. EVE S. BUZAWA et al., RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE INTERSECTION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND HUMAN SERVICES 130 (4th ed. 2012) (analyzing prosecutors’ tendency to charge generic,
simple battery even when a more specific charge for domestic violence might be possible, and
attributing this tendency in part of budget pressures, among other factors).
142. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
IN AMERICA (2003) (noting that one reason for the growing popularity of plea bargaining is the desire
to clear up crowded dockets).
143. The California Supreme Court cited expert testimony that "[a]bout 80 to 85 percent of victims
‘actually recant at some point’ in prosecutions of domestic violence. See People v. Brown, 33 Cal.4th
892, 897 (2004).
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Confrontation Clause that an accuser’s hearsay statement might be inadmissible
unless cross‐examination is possible.144 For all these reasons, undercharging is
attractive.
Ironically, the Hayes and Castleman decisions may hinder enforcement of the
Lautenberg Amendment by decreasing local prosecutors’ reliance on specialized
domestic violence statutes. The Court’s recent jurisprudence might breed
overconfidence among local prosecutors that a generic assault conviction with a
scant record is all that federal prosecutors need to charge the Lautenberg
Amendment. While Hayes and Castleman may improve the likelihood that
federal prosecutors can use simple assaults as predicates, these decisions may
have also decreased the likelihood that federal law enforcement officials can
recognize the predicates in databases.
B. Effects of Undercharging
As noted at the outset of Part III, undercharging of domestic violence by
local prosecutors hinders the enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment
because the potential predicates are hard to detect. Many commentators have
noted the consequence that the Lautenberg Amendment is virtually
“unenforceable”145 and “unworkable.”146 Convicted batterers still have access to
firearms,147 and this fact greatly increases the likelihood that the batterers will kill
their victims.148 An op‐ed in USA Today opined that the Lautenberg Amendment
“fails spectacularly” in its goal of protecting women from gun violence.”149
When the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing, on July 30, 2014,
concerning the enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment, senators and
witnesses expressed dismay that many convicted domestic abusers are still able
to possess guns with impunity.150
144. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2005) (noting
dramatic increase in dismissals of domestic violence prosecutions following Supreme Court’s
reinvigoration of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington).
145. See Disarmament, supra note 15 (“[E]xisting federal laws intended to disarm spousal abusers
have proved largely unenforceable”).
146. Melanie C. Schneider, The Imprecise Draftsmanship of the Lautenberg Amendment and the
Resulting Problems for the Judiciary, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 505, 547 (2008) (declaring that
Lautenberg Amendment is “manifestly unworkable” even when courts are willing to interpret
language favorably to law enforcement).
147. Jennifer L. Vainik, Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic
Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1130 (2007). According to Vainik, the
federal gun bans for domestic abusers “have not proven to be an effective means of addressing gun
violence against women.” Id. at 1127.
148. See infra Part I.A.
149. Kimberly Brusk, Gun Laws Still Don’t Protect Women from Abusers, U.S.A. TODAY (July 30,
2014), available at www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/07/30/gun-control-deaths-womencolumn/13332165/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (“[C]urrent federal law fails spectacularly” at protecting
women from gun crimes committed by convicted domestic abusers).
150. E.g., VAWA Next Steps: Protecting Women From Gun Violence: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (statements of Sen. Pat Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., Christopher
Schmaling, Sheriff, Racine County, Wisconsin, and Jacqueline Campbell, Professor, Johns Hopkins
School of Nursing),)), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/vawa-next-stepsprotecting-women-from-gun-violence (follow hyperlinks to each individual’s statement) (noting
various problems that hinder enforcement of federal gun ban for convicted domestic abusers).
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Even if undercharging did not impede the detection of defendants who violate
Lautenberg, another significant problem would remain: defendants convicted of
simple assault sometimes lack notice of the gun ban.151 As Chief Justice Roberts
noted in his Hayes dissent, “an individual should not go to jail for failing to
conduct a 50‐state survey or comb through obscure legislative history.”152 The
notice problem is an important issue of fairness, which also erodes the protection
of victims because armed abusers may not know of their firearm disability.153 By
contrast, if local prosecutors were to utilize the specialized statutes for domestic
assault, courts could develop protocols for informing defendants that they have
lost their gun rights.
A third adverse consequence of undercharging is that the applicability of
the gun ban may turn on prosecutorial discretion. Some commentators welcome
a high level of discretion for prosecutors,154 but other commentators note that
discretion invites arbitrariness or vindictiveness in the selection of charges.155
The application of the gun ban should not turn on whether a local prosecutor
liked or disliked the defendant at the time the prosecutor charged the predicate
offense. The elimination of discretion would ensure that all similarly situated
defendants receive the same treatment.
Undercharging of domestic violence has many harmful effects unrelated to
the Lautenberg Amendment. Undercharging thwarts the intent of state
legislatures to match certain punishments to the crime of domestic violence.
Undercharging also diminishes the protection of battered women. An accused
returning home from jail shortly after a complaint may increase the
complainant’s vulnerability by demonstrating the futility of calling the police.
Other harms result from the mislabeling of domestic violence as general assault.
An employer who is considering whether to hire an abuser convicted of simply
assault for a sensitive job might not be able to discern from a background check
that the defendant is a domestic abuser. A survivor of domestic violence might
have difficulty demonstrating her eligibility for government benefits and
151. For a general discussion of prosecutors’ motives and tactics in plea bargaining and charge
bargaining, see George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L. J. 857 (2000).
152. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 436 (2009).
153. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 436-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (in his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts raises
concerns about “fair warning” due to the uncertain application of the Lautenberg Amendment to
particular categories of predicate offenses).
154. Michael A. Caves, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Obligatory Charging under the Ashcroft Memo, 9
J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 1–2 (2008) (arguing that Ashcroft’s memo did not adequately take account
of the prosecutor’s duty to balance several goals, some of which do not align with a charge-to-the-hilt
mandate); see Kersey, supra note 122121122, at 1932 (favoring prosecutorial discretion in determining
whether to charge predicates that will result in firearms disability under Lautenberg Amendment; the
“state prosecutor is in the best position to determine whether the domestic offender is a violent
offender who will “reach for the gun” or an offender whose actions are mildly offensive but unlikely
to lead to further violence”).
155. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q.
713, 732–3 (1999) (noting that unchecked prosecutorial discretion “can lead to violations of citizens’
rights through the arbitrary or, worse, malevolent exercise of authority”); Murray R. Garnick, Two
Models of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REV. 467, 467 (1983) (“With this discretion comes a real
possibility of prosecutorial abuse”); cf. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 870 (stressing that charging decision should not turn on arbitrary discretion of
prosecutor).
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resources that state legislatures have made available for battered women. In
short, undercharging is a dishonest characterization of domestic violence that
redounds to the detriment of battered women and society as a whole.
C. Inadequacy of Safeguards
There are several safeguards designed to prevent, or mitigate the harms of,
prosecutors’ tendency to undercharge cases involving domestic violence. This
Subpart will consider four categories of safeguards, and argue that none of them
is sufficient to fix the problem of undercharging and ensure the adequate
application of the Lautenberg Amendment to convicted abusers.
One safeguard is the reporting requirement imposed by Congress in 2005 as
a condition for states to receive funding under the Violence Against Women Act.
The statute required states to improve their processes for providing information
to the FBI about the facts underlying misdemeanor convictions involving
domestic violence,156 so that federal law enforcement officials could recognize
convicted abusers even if local prosecutors had filed charges that did not require
proof of domestic violence. Notwithstanding these improvements, there are still
significant gaps in the reporting system.157 Many jurisdictions are not completing
the questionnaires used to determine whether ambiguous misdemeanor
convictions might qualify as predicates under the Lautenberg Amendment.158 As
a result, a significant number of convicted batterers are able to escape
accountability in background checks because domestic violence is not
conspicuous in their conviction records.
The greater use of factual
questionnaires for the FBI’s databases has not offset the harm caused by local
prosecutors’ reluctance to charge batterers appropriately.
A second safeguard, the U.S. Department of Justice’s requirement that
prosecutors must charge the most serious offense,159 has not solved the problem
of undercharging in the context of domestic violence. The requirement applies at
the federal level, but the federal government handles very few misdemeanors
involving domestic violence. State agencies and local district attorneys’ offices
prosecute the lion’s share of domestic violence offenses, but these offices
generally have not imposed such requirements. Further, the U.S. Department of
Justice altered its charging policy in 2010 due to concerns about overcharging of
drug cases, so now even federal prosecutors have more discretion in selecting
charges.160
156. For a summary of the relevant requirements in the 2005 VAWA Reauthorization Act, see
Ronald Adrine & Alexandria Ruden, Domestic Violence and Firearm Prohibition, in OHIO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE LAW, at § 18:13 (Baldwin’s Ohio Handbook Ser. Series., 2014).
157. As Senator Grassley noted in his testimony during the hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on July 30, 2014, there are no submissions of Lautenberg predicates to NICS in some
states, and there are very few submissions in other states. See supra note 124, 129.
158. Id.
159. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors,
DEPARTMENT POLICY CONCERNING CHARGING CRIMINAL OFFENSES, DISPOSITION OF CHARGES, AND
SENTENCING (Sept. 22, 2003).
160. Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to All Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memochallenging-sentencing.pdf.
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A third safeguard against undercharging is sentencing based on the conduct
underlying an offense, rather simply the conviction. The goal behind this
approach is to sentence offenders based on what they actually did, irrespective of
how prosecutors charged them.161 Proponents of sentencing based on offense
conduct have suggested that it might reduce some of the incentives for
undercharging and might promote uniformity in the disposition of cases.162
Sentencing based on offense conduct has fallen far short of this goal. State
courts—which handle the vast majority of cases involving domestic violence—
did not embrace the new sentencing system to the same extent as federal
courts.163 Even at the federal level, prosecutors were able to limit their
presentation of offense conduct to judges in order to ensure that sentences
aligned with the charges actually filed.164 An even more fundamental problem
with sentencing based on offense conduct arose when the Supreme Court held
that the right to trial by jury limits the ability of judges to sentence defendants for
conduct not charged in the indictment.165 In short, sentencing reform has not
been a viable means of reining in prosecutorial discretion in charging.
Some states allow crime victims to express their views when prosecutors are
contemplating plea agreements with perpetrators of violent crime. One rationale
for the involvement of victims is that their input might limit the willingness of
prosecutors to offer overly generous terms to defendants. Yet, research does not
indicate that victims exert much influence over plea offers.166 Survivors of
domestic violence are particularly unlikely to insist on strict charges, because 80
percent of these survivors will change their stories or refuse to cooperate with
the prosecution. 167
In sum, there is little reason for confidence in the various safeguards that
161. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2 (2013) (explaining that sentencing
under the guidelines is based on the conduct actually committed by the defendant in the course of
committing the offense).
162. See Gregory Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 179
(2011) (noting that one purpose of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in basing sentences on offense
conduct rather than the offense of conviction was to limit prosecutorial discretion in undercharging
or dealing down charges, which would undermine the uniformity valued by the Commission).
163. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1196-1206 (2005) (discussing wide variety of sentencing guidelines at state
level; few states track the federal sentencing model).
164. Douglas A. Berman, Is Fact Bargaining Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines?, FED. SENT’G
REP., May–MayJune 1996, at 300 (discussing results of study that found large number of federal
sentences were based not on actual facts of case, but on recital of facts and proposed guideline
calculations in plea agreements).
165. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000) (holding that any fact that increases penalty
for crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to jury at trial phase and proved
beyond reasonable doubt); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004) (reversing the trial
court’s imposition of a statutory sentencing enhancement in a domestic violence case because the
prosecution had not proven the predicate facts to the jury, as required by the Sixth Amendment).
166. Susan E. Gegan & Nicholas Ernesto Rodriguez, Victims’ Roles in the Criminal Justice System: A
Fallacy of Victim Empowerment?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 225, 229–37 (1992) (noting that even
when statutes permit their involvement, victims rarely are able to influence plea negotiations); see
Sarah N. Weilling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 301, 338–42 (1987)
(summarizing states’ varying approaches to allowing or mandating victims’ participation in plea
negotiations).
167. See supra note 143.
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purport to limit the harmful effects of undercharging. The only way to solve the
problem is to impose a specific obligation on local prosecutors to file the right
charges in cases involving domestic violence.
IV. A PROPOSED ETHICAL DUTY TO CHARGE BATTERERS APPROPRIATELY
The next subsection will set forth a proposed ethical rule guiding
prosecutors who charge cases involving domestic violence. The following
Subpart will consider the best vehicle for codifying such a duty. Finally,
attention will focus on possible objections to the proposed rule.
A. Nature of the Ethical Duty
An ethical duty to charge domestic violence appropriately must include
several elements. It must include an obligation to bring the most serious
applicable charge, and to invoke all statutes and enhancements specifically
tailored to cases involving intimate partners as victims or witnesses. The ethical
duty to charge appropriately must include an obligation to avoid dispositions
that will hinder the subsequent detection of a qualifying predicate under the
Lautenberg Amendment. The ethical duty must include a “safety valve” that
permits adjustment of charges in extraordinary circumstances, so long as the
disposition remains proportionate to the offense and accords adequate protection
to victims and witnesses.
Here is one possible formulation of an ethical duty to charge batterers
appropriately:
In a case involving an allegation of domestic violence, a prosecutor must charge
the most serious offense readily supported by evidence accessible at the time of
the charging decision. The charging instrument must include any possibly
applicable offense or enhancement that specifies the intimate or familial
relationship between the assailant and victims and/or witnesses, assuming that
such offense or enhancement is readily supported by evidence accessible at the
time of the charging decision. The prosecutor shall not consent to any negotiated
disposition involving dismissal or expunction except under extraordinary
circumstances, and in any event, the prosecutor must seek a disposition
reflecting the gravity of the offense and ensuring reasonable protection of all
victims from further violence. In a case involving a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, a prosecutor shall file thorough records with the court and
shall submit, or cause to be submitted, thorough information to the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) in order to ensure that the
defendant is subject to any applicable firearms disability under federal and state
law.

The proposed rule rests on compelling principles. Prosecutors should not
subordinate the interests of accusers just because the United States’ adversarial
system puts the primary emphasis on the conflict between the government and
the accused. Prosecutors sometimes exploit victims instrumentally to secure
convictions in cases that proceed to trial,168 regarding victims as nuisances

168. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1358 (2005) (“The simple
adversarial model does not capture the complexity [of a trial involving domestic violence]. A better
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hindering the efficient disposition of cases through plea bargains or dismissals.
The ethical duty to charge domestic violence cases appropriately would align
with the deontological imperative that every person, including a crime victim,
has inherent dignity and moral autonomy; no person is simply a means to an
end. Deontological philosophy also posits that violent crime is a lapse of moral
duty deserving a particular punishment irrespective of prosecutors’ concerns
about efficiency and streamlining caseloads. Put a different way, the gravity of
domestic violence does not vary depending on a prosecutor’s workload.
The proposed duty would also result in several other tangible benefits. The
rule would increase the odds that local prosecutors would select charges that
clearly signal the defendant’s commission of domestic violence. Convictions for
such offenses would be more easily recognizable in NCIS and other law
enforcement databases, leading to greater accuracy in background checks and
greater detection of § 922(g)(9) violators when police consult the databases after
search warrants and traffic stops. More generally, the new duty proposed here
would promote consistency in the treatment of cases involving domestic
violence, thereby increasing deterrence of prospective offenders. Victims would
gain greater confidence to file complaints without fear of reprisals after abrupt
dismissals. The proper charging of domestic violence would lead to greater
precision and clarity in court records. When prosecutors explicitly label
domestic violence as such, there is a great likelihood that judges in marital
dissolution cases will not award custody to batterers, that battered women will
be able to qualify for special government benefits, and that prospective
employers will not hire batterers for jobs in sensitive settings.
B. Codifying the Duty
There are several bodies of authority regulating the ethics of prosecutors.
Which would be the best vehicle for the proposed rule requiring prosecutors to
charge batterers appropriately? This Subpart will consider four options: the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA Standards for Practice
(Prosecution Function), the internal rules of prosecuting agencies, and state
statutes.
The optimal home for the new ethical rule would be the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, because they provide a template adopted in virtually all
states’ ethical codes. State bars enforce their ethics codes through disciplinary
proceedings. Harmful consequences, ranging from censure to disbarment, could
befall violators of the state ethical codes, so attorneys are more attentive to these
codes than to hortatory, nonbinding guidelines.
Another advantage of
regulating prosecutors under state bars’ ethical codes is that the panels
evaluating bar complaints consist primarily of attorneys who are not
prosecutors. These “outsiders” bring a degree of accountability that an in‐house
review by fellow prosecutors would lack.
The proposed rule would insert a new topic into the ABA Model Rules. But
the rule would fit well alongside other existing rules. Many of these rules take

model posits a trilateral adversarial process, in which the defense, the prosecution, and the accuser all
vie against one another.”)
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account of third‐party interests when such interests might not otherwise attract
sufficient attention. One example is the Rule 1.6(b) list of exceptions to attorney‐
client confidentiality, allowing disclosure of client information when necessary to
avert “reasonably certain death of substantial bodily harm to a third party,”
among other categories of harm to third parties.169 Rule 1.6(b)(7) also allows
attorneys to reveal client information when necessary to comply with statutes
that mandate reporting of child abuse.170 Another relevant example is Rule
4.4(a), which directs that a lawyer representing a client shall not unduly
“embarrass, delay or burden a third person.”171 The most on‐point example is
Rule 3.8, which sets forth several duties of prosecutors with respect to both the
accused and third parties, including a subpoint that regulates the charging
decision.172 A new ethical rule to charge batterers appropriately is a reasonable
extension of principles that already underlie the ABA Model Rules in general,
and Rule 3.8 in particular.173
A less desirable option for codifying the new duty would be to include it in
the Standards for Criminal Practice (Prosecution Function). Approved by the
ABA House of Delegates in 1993, these standards set forth specific guidance for
both prosecutors and defense attorneys. The standards for prosecutors include a
list of considerations to take into account when charging a case initially,174 and

169.

Rule 1.6(b)(1)-(3) and (6)-(7) of the ABA Model Rules provides that:

A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client o the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interest or property
of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission
of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services;
(6) to comply with other law or a court order; or
(7) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s change of
employment or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the
revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise
prejudice the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014).
170. The ABA Model Rules authorize a lawyer to disclose client information when necessary “to
comply with other law or a court order.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (2014). Most
states have enacted laws that require or permit several categories of professionals, including lawyers,
to report otherwise confidential information to the appropriate authorities when those professionals
encounter evidence of child abuse. For a state-by-state analysis of such statutes, see Comm’n on
Domestic Violence, American Bar Ass’n, MANDATORY REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE (2009) (on file with
author).
171. Rule 4.4(a) of the ABA Model Rules provides that, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall
not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2014).)
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (2014) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . .
refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”).
173. The rule proposed in this article could go at the end of Rule 3.8 as a freestanding subpoint (i).
174. The standard labeled “Discretion in the Charging Decision” includes the following guidance
concerning decisions to charge or decline prosecution:
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other considerations to bear in mind when considering a negotiated
disposition.175 On first examination, the Standards might seem to be a good
home for the new duty to charge batterers appropriately: after all, they treat the
issues of charging and plea negotiation in more detail than do the ABA Model
Rules.176 But no state bar has adopted the Standards for Criminal Practices as
part of mandatory regime subject to enforcement through bar discipline. At best,
the Standards for Criminal Practice are precatory and aspirational, and
prosecutors would be less likely to follow such nonbinding guidelines than to
obey the first‐tier authority in the state ethics codes based on the ABA Model
Rules.
Some prosecutorial agencies have extensive in‐house rules and guidelines
for their attorneys. For example, the U.S. Attorneys’ manuals span nine
volumes.177 However, the ethical duty to charge batterers appropriately deserves
to be codified universally, and in‐house regulation would lead to a patchwork
approach. The local jurisdictions that handle the great bulk of domestic violence
misdemeanors are the least likely to have in‐house ethical codes. Even if all
prosecutorial agencies had ethics codes, the relegation of an ethical matter to this
level of authority would result in a wide disparity of approaches, thwarting the

(b) The prosecutor is not obligated to present all charges which the evidence might
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with
the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist
which would support a conviction.
Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or
her discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor’s reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense:
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or
the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of the complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension of conviction of others; and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function Standard 3-3.9 (1993).
175. Standard 3-3.4.1, labeled “Availability for Plea Discussions,” includes the following
provisions:
The prosecutor should have and make known a general policy or willingness to consult
with defense counsel concerning disposition of charges by plea.
A prosecutor should not engage in plea discussions directly with an accused who is
represented by defense counsel, except with defense counsel’s approval. Where the
defendant has properly waived counsel, the prosecuting attorney may engage in plea
discussions with the defendant, although, where feasible, a record of such discussions
should be made and preserved.
A prosecutor should not knowingly make false statements or representations of fact or law
in the course of plea discussions with defense counsel or the accused.
Id. at 3-3.4.1.
176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 171; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra
note 172.
177. The text of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual is available in the Justice Department’s FOIA Reading
Room. See U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
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intent of Congress to treat domestic abusers uniformly.178 Another problem with
in‐house regulation is the apparent conflict of interest when prosecutors sit in
judgment of other prosecutors within the same agency.
State statutes deserve consideration as a vehicle for the regulation of
prosecutorial ethics, but this approach might be too radical. State bars are
generally reluctant to cede their self‐regulation to legislatures. In fact, the
legislative branch has rarely taken up the regulation of the legal profession at all.
Examples of statutes regulating the legal profession are most noteworthy for
their infrequency.179 A proposal to legislate new standards for lawyers might
provoke backlash in state bars at a time when it is important to build a consensus
in favor of appropriate charging for cases involving domestic violence.
In sum, the best place to incorporate an ethical duty to charge batterers
appropriately would be in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The
new rule could be a freestanding subpoint (i) at the end of Model Rule 3.8.
Codification at this level would be most likely to achieve uniform results.
C. Foreseeable Objections
Several objections to this Article’s proposal are possible. The first is that
limits on prosecutorial discretion are generally undesirable. When Attorney
General John Ashcroft instructed federal prosecutors to charge the most serious
offense in all categories of cases (subject to very limited exceptions),180 critics
complained that the policy led to draconian sentences and failed to account for
unique circumstances that might warrant leniency in a particular case.181 The
zealous charging of drug cases – which federal prosecutors handle more
commonly than cases involving spousal abuse – drew especially strong
condemnation.182 Eventually Attorney General Eric Holder heeded the critics
and revised the Ashcroft guidelines to allow federal prosecutors greater
178. Senator Lautenberg wanted his amendment to apply uniformly in all states. See 142 CONG.
REC. S11226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. S10377-78 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). Cosponsors shared this concern. See 142 CONG. REC. S12341 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Dodd); 142 CONG. REC. H10434 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); 142 CONG.
REC. S10380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); 142 CONG. REC. S10380 (daily ed.
Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
179. One example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that Congress passed in the wake of corporate
scandals in which attorneys neglected their whistleblowing duties. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (imposing, in Section 307, a set of ethical obligations on attorneys
who practice before the Securities and Exchange Commission).
180. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors, (Sept. 22,
2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm.
181. Michael A. Caves, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Obligatory Charging Under the Ashcroft Memo, 9
J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 1-2 (2008) (arguing that Ashcroft’s memo did not adequately take account
of the prosecutor’s duty to balance several goals, some of which do not align with a charge-to-the-hilt
mandate); see Kersey, supra note 122, at 1932 (favoring prosecutorial discretion in determining
whether to charge predicates that will result in firearms disability under Lautenberg Amendment; the
“state prosecutor is in the best position to determine whether the domestic offender is a violent
offender who will “reach for the gun” or an offender whose actions are mildly offensive but unlikely
to lead to further violence”).
182. See generally Susan P. Weinstein, Ethical Considerations for Prosecutors in Drug Courts, 15 CRIM.
JUST. 26, 29 (complaining that overcharging of drug cases was common and harmful in traditional
courts).
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discretion in charging.183 The criticism of overcharging in federal drug cases,
however, does not apply with the same force to this article’s proposal. The
punishments prescribed by federal drug statutes were extremely harsh during
the era of obligatory charging. By contrast, the punishments for misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence are generally lenient. Drug prosecutions do not
present the same practical challenges as domestic violence prosecutions, such as
unavailable witnesses, lack of cooperators and lack of physical evidence.
Moreover, the history of prosecutorial reluctance to charge domestic violence is
unique to this category of crime. Simply put, the need to mandate prosecutorial
zeal is greater, and the effects are less dangerous, in the context of domestic
violence.184
Some might argue that a requirement of strict charging could reduce
opportunities for cooperation by defendants in cases involving domestic
violence. But batterers typically have little value in cooperating as government
witnesses against co‐defendants, because domestic violence is generally a single‐
defendant crime. It is true that prosecutors might want batterers to agree to
participate in treatment programs,185 but lenient initial charges are not necessary
to entice such participation; the court can require it as part of the sentence, or the
prosecutor can incentivize it by recommending a reduced sentence, if not a
reduced charge. A stricter initial charge might actually increase the likelihood of
cooperation by the defendant, because he would have more to lose if he were
uncooperative.
Another possible criticism is that this article’s proposal might have a
“chilling effect” on prosecutors or victims of domestic violence. Perhaps
prosecutors might prefer to forego charges altogether for fear that dismissals and
charge bargaining would not be possible if a particular prosecution proved
difficult. Or perhaps victims of domestic violence would not complain to police
in the first place if the only possible outcome were a strict charge. These
concerns are not new, however. The same concerns arose in response to prior
initiatives to treat domestic violence more seriously.186 The concerns seem to lack
merit with respect to prosecutors, who are under political pressure to charge
domestic violence even if lenient dispositions are no longer possible. Victims
need to summon police and extricate themselves from danger even if the
consequences befalling the batterers will be more serious due to the new rules.
Enlightened policy makers have long ago realized that the victims’ sympathy for
the abusers cannot lead to lower sanctions; punishment is not less urgent just
183. Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to All Federal Prosecutors, DEPARTMENT
POLICY ON CHARGING AND SENTENCING (May 19, 2010).
184. But see Kersey, supra note 122, at 1932 (favoring prosecutorial discretion in determining
whether to charge predicates that will result in firearms disability under Lautenberg Amendment; the
“state prosecutor is in the best position to determine whether the domestic offender is a violent
offender who will “reach for the gun” or an offender whose actions are mildly offensive but unlikely
to lead to further violence.”).
185. E.g., Mary M. Lovik, Specialized Services for Survivors and Perpetrators of Battering, 90 MICH. B.
J. 44 (2011) (indicating that “courts frequently order batterer intervention as a probation condition for
persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes”).
186. Mandatory arrest policies and no-drop policies also drew criticism that they might result in a
“chilling effect.” For a review of arguments on both sides, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, BATTERED
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 123 (2000).
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because a victim fearing reprisals urges leniency for the offender.
One last foreseeable objection is that the proposed rule is too specific for the
ABA Model Rules. Yet Rule 3.8 already includes many rules that impose highly
specific duties on prosecutors, such as the duty to refrain from calling lawyers
before the grand jury except in certain limited circumstances.187 The general
trend is for ethical rules to become more specific,188 and specificity is particularly
important for rules governing prosecutors.189 Some critics might argue that that a
unique ethical rule for charging cases involving domestic violence does not make
sense when the ABA Model Rules do not regulate the charging of other cases, but
the uniqueness of domestic violence justifies this special treatment.190 In any
event, it is certainly possible to add ethical rules for charging other categories of
cases in the future.
In sum, the advantages of establishing an ethical rule for the charging of
domestic violence outweigh the possible disadvantages. While prosecutors
might resent limitations on their discretion, it is more important to promote
uniformity in charging and to protect battered women from potentially lethal
violence.
CONCLUSION
Many commentators hailed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Castleman as an
important step forward in the reduction of gun‐related violence by convicted
batterers. The reality is more complicated.
The Court in Castleman adopted the broad reading of the Lautenberg
Amendment urged by the government and amici representing women’s groups
and law enforcement organizations. Yet this interpretation will not necessarily
lead to an increase in the number of prosecutions under the Lautenberg
Amendment. Ironically, Castleman may have engendered greater confidence
among local prosecutors that convictions under a wide range of assault statutes
can count as predicates for the federal gun ban, heightening the risk that
potentially qualifying convictions will escape detection by federal law
enforcement officials when the records do not clearly indicate that the
convictions involved domestic violence. For example, local prosecutors may opt
to charge generic assault rather than domestic assault because the two charges
187. The Model Rules provide that, “A prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . not subpoena a
lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client
unless the prosecutor reasonably believes the information sought is not protected from disclosure by
any applicable privilege; the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing
investigation or prosecution; and there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (2014).
188. The trend in ethical codes has been a reduction of general, hortatory provisions and an
increase in more specific provisions. Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and Uses
of Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 874 n.4 (2002) (noting “the broader trend in
legal ethics toward specific rules and away from broad statements and principles”); Richard W.
Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2001) (stating that lawyers’ ethical codes
“have migrated away from broad standards and toward clearly defined rules”).
189. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the
Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 243 (1993) (stating that ethical rules that
“direct particular conduct” are “simpler to enforce”).
190. See supra note 142 (discussing unique challenges that arise in prosecuting batterers).
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seem fungible under Lautenberg, but the former charge may not be conspicuous
enough to signal the firearms disability to federal officials.
The best way to ensure the appropriate punishment of gun possession by
convicted domestic batterers is to charge them appropriately in the first instance.
Local prosecutors who handle cases involving domestic violence should not
select generic charges in order to simplify and hasten disposition of these cases.
Local prosecutors should not consent to reduced charges, dismissals or
expunctions that allow defendants to gain access to firearms.
This article has proposed an ethical duty that would obligate prosecutors to
charge the most serious offense in a case involving domestic violence, assuming
that the offense is readily provable at the time of the charging decision. The
proposal would fit well alongside other provisions in the ABA Model Rules that
require attorneys to take account of third‐party interests (in this case, the
interests of victims and potential victims) when such interests might otherwise
attract insufficient attention.
Implementation of the rule proposed in this article would help to ensure
that a defendant’s conduct, rather than a local prosecutor’s discretion, will be the
key determinant of the defendant’s eligibility to possess firearms. As Senator
Lautenberg urged nearly 20 years ago, no convicted batterer should be able to
evade firearms the disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), because “[t]here is no
margin of error when it comes to domestic abuse and guns.”191

191. 142 CONG. REC. S10377 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).

